Still Particular: A Reply to Ganson and Mehta by Gomes, Anil & French, Craig
1 
 
 
 
STILL PARTICULAR: A REPLY TO GANSON AND 
MEHTA 
Craig French† & Anil Gomes‡ 
†Trinity Hall, University of Cambridge 
‡Trinity College, University of Oxford 
 
[Archived May 2016] 
1. Introduction 
We are grateful to Ganson and Mehta (forthcoming) for their reply to our 
defence of phenomenal particularism against the objections raised by 
Mehta in his (2014). Their reply clarifies the nature of their objections to 
phenomenal particularism and helps identify the locus of our 
disagreements. In what follows we aim to defend phenomenal 
particularism against the objections raised in their reply. 
Ganson and Mehta raise and clarify two objections from Mehta (2014). 
The first concerns the presentation of the same object in different sense-
modalities; the second concerns the experiences of an ideal imaginer. We 
discuss each in turn. 
2. Lack of Similarity 
Mehta introduces the first problem in his (2014) in the following way: 
‘Broadly stated, the objection is that the phenomenal particularist makes 
implausible predictions about similarities and differences in phenomenal 
character’ (p.317). This challenge is raised via what we’ll call the Wine 
Case: a case involving a pair of experiences, (A1) a visual experience of a 
quantity of wine in a glass, and (A2) a tactile experience of the very same 
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quantity of wine spread out on one’s lap after a spillage (p.318). What is 
the problem for phenomenal particularism supposed to be here?  
Ganson and Mehta introduce phenomenal particularism as the view that 
‘external particulars… are sometimes part of the phenomenal character of 
experience. To say that a particular is part of the phenomenal character of an 
experience is to say that an exhaustive characterization of what the 
experience is like for the subject of the experience must reference that very 
particular; otherwise the characterization is incomplete’ (p.1). Let the parts 
of an experience be its character-parts. And let any character part which is a 
particular be a p-character-part – where ‘p’ stands for particular. 
Phenomenal particularism is the view that the phenomenal character of 
experience has p-character-parts. 
In the Wine Case, A1 and A2 have a numerically identical p-character-part 
since the same portion of wine is a character-part of each. In our (2016) 
we showed that this doesn’t entail, for the particularist, that these 
experiences have the same phenomenal character. Indeed, even complete 
sameness of p-character-parts doesn’t entail that the experiences have the 
same phenomenal character. Phenomenal character is understood in terms 
of what it is like for a subject to undergo an experience (Mehta 2014, 
p.311). Sameness of phenomenal character is thus understood as follows: 
(P-Identity) Experiences X and Y are phenomenally the same (the same in 
phenomenal character) just in case what it is like to undergo X is the same 
as what it is like to undergo Y.  
We spelled out in our (2016) how the particularist can accept that what is 
it like for S to undergo an experience X can be different from what it is like 
for S to undergo an experience Y even when X and Y have all the same p-
character-parts. For the particularist can hold that the standpoint from 
which we perceive the particulars we do makes a difference to the 
phenomenal character of experience, and thus sameness of p-character-
parts, doesn’t entail phenomenal sameness. In the Wine Case, the 
particular portion of wine which is part of A1 is perceived from a different 
standpoint to the same particular portion of wine which is part of A2, and 
this difference in standpoint can explain why the experiences have different 
phenomenal characters. 
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Thus the particularist is not committed to the idea that A1 and A2 are 
phenomenally the same, even if A1 and A2 have numerically the same p-
character-parts. And if the objection to particularism is that it predicts 
phenomenal sameness between A1 and A2, then the objection fails.  
However,  
Mehta’s worry about phenomenal particularism is not that the view 
predicts no phenomenal differences between the two experiences where 
there are some; rather, the worry is that the view mistakenly predicts at 
least one phenomenal similarity where there are none. There is no 
similarity in what the two experiences are like for the subject, but 
phenomenal particularism predicts at least one similarity in virtue of 
the fact that these are experiences of the same portion of wine (Ganson 
and Mehta, p.4). 
The objection, then, is not that A1 and A2 are phenomenally the same, 
but that they are phenomenally similar. Does this mean that the remarks 
about particularism mentioned above are ineffective? We think not. For 
we want to suggest that the argument here fails for reasons similar to those 
we sketched above. 
We can reconstruct this argument as follows: 
1. A1 and A2 have no phenomenal similarities. 
2. Phenomenal particularism predicts that A1 and A2 have some 
phenomenal similarity. 
Therefore 
3. Phenomenal particularism is false.  
 
We will argue that premise (2) is false: phenomenal particularism does not 
predict that A1 and A2 have some phenomenal similarity. The grounds 
Ganson and Mehta have for assuming that the particularist is committed 
to the claim that A1 and A2 are phenomenally similar is that A1 and A2 
have some sameness of p-character-parts. But we will argue that just as 
sameness of p-character-parts doesn’t imply phenomenal identity, nor does 
it imply phenomenal similarity. 
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Ganson and Mehta don’t spell out phenomenal similarity, but this seems 
like a plausible way to understand the notion: 
(P-Similarity) Experiences X and Y are phenomenally similar when there is 
an aspect of the phenomenal character of X, X*, and an aspect of the 
phenomenal character of Y, Y*, such that what its like to undergo X 
insofar as it has X* is the same as (identical to) what its like to undergo Y 
insofar as it has Y*. 
For example, S has an experience of a red tomato, (call this experience T), 
later she has an experience of a glove of the very same colour, (call this 
experience G). These two experiences are phenomenally similar in that 
they exhibit some sameness in what it is like to undergo them. That is, 
there is an aspect of the phenomenal character of T pertaining to the 
redness of the tomato (call this aspect T*), and an aspect of the 
phenomenal character of G pertaining to the redness of the glove (call this 
aspect G*), and what it is like to undergo each experience insofar as they 
have these aspects, is the same. That is, what it is like to undergo T qua T* 
= what it is like to undergo G qua G*. 
P-Similarity doesn’t imply P-identity for it is compatible with two 
experiences having aspects in common that they have aspects which are 
different. That is, there may be other aspects of phenomenally similar 
experiences which generate differences in what it is like to undergo them. 
For instance, the aspect of the character of T pertaining to the round bulgy 
shape of the tomato (T**), and the aspect of the character of G pertaining 
to the hand-like shape of the glove (G**) generate such differences: what 
its like to undergo T qua T** ≠ what its like to undergo G qua G**. 
We can now understand Ganson and Mehta’s challenge. They hold that 
although A1 and A2 share a p-character-part, there are no phenomenal 
similarities between A1 and A2. And they think that phenomenal 
particularism is committed to there being such a similarity. We will grant 
Ganson and Mehta the first claim. For phenomenal particularism is not 
committed to there being any such similarities. 
Why think that phenomenal particularism is committed to a phenomenal 
similarity? Ganson and Mehta write that ‘phenomenal particularism 
predicts at least one similarity in virtue of the fact that these are 
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experiences of the same portion of wine’ (p.4). That is, Ganson and Mehta 
take the phenomenal particularist to be committed to the following:  
(Particularist Prediction) What it is like to experience A1 qua its wine 
aspect A1* is identical to what it is like to experience A2 qua its wine aspect 
A2*. 
If the particularist is committed to the following, what it is like to 
experience A1 qua A1* is constituted entirely by its p-character-part, the 
wine, and what it is like to experience A2 qua A2* is constituted entirely 
by its p-character-part, the wine, then (Particularist Prediction) is a 
commitment of particularism, and (2) holds.  
But the Phenomenal Particularist is not committed to the above claims, for 
reasons rehearsed above – which we can now put with respect to P-
Similarity, not P-Identity. The particularist can reject the idea that what it 
is like to undergo A1 qua A1* is wholly constituted by its wine character-
part. For this aspect of the phenomenal character of A1 – call it P1 – is 
something the particularist will capture in terms of acquaintance with the 
wine from a particular standpoint. Likewise, the particularist can reject the 
idea that what it is like to undergo A2 qua A2* is wholly constituted by its 
(identical) wine character-part. For this aspect of the phenomenal character 
of A2 – call it P2 – is something the particularist will capture in terms of 
acquaintance with the wine from a particular standpoint. (2) has the 
particularist predict that P1 = P2. But P1 and P2 are constitutively 
different according to particularism, for they involve different standpoints; 
therefore the particularist rejects the identity. Thus the particularist rejects 
the phenomenal similarity. Thus, (2) is false. 
It seems to us then that the argument from the Wine Case that Ganson 
and Mehta present fails for a similar reason to the argument we considered 
in our previous paper. 
3. Imagination 
Whereas Ganson and Mehta’s first objection accused the phenomenal 
particularist of predicting similarities where there are none, their second 
accuses the particularist of predicting difference where there is a similarity. 
We can call this the Ideal Imaginer Case. It involves a pair of experiences, 
(B1) a visual imagining of a snow-covered tree, as undertaken by ‘an ideal 
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imaginer, capable of picturing a scene with perfect clarity and stability’ 
(p.4), and (B2) a visual perception of a snow-covered tree. These 
experiences, they hold, have ‘at least some overlap in phenomenal 
character’ (p.4). 
The target here is clean phenomenal particularism, the view on which ‘the 
phenomenal character of any experience displaying particularity (like the 
subject’s experience when she sees the tree) is composed wholly of 
particulars, while any experience not displaying particularity (like the 
subject’s experience when she visually imagines the tree) is composed 
wholly of non-particulars’ (p.5). According to Ganson and Mehta, ‘clean 
phenomenal particularism cannot accommodate the similarity in 
phenomenal character across the two experiences of the ideal imaginer, 
since particulars are not identical or relevantly similar to non-particulars’ 
(p.5) 
We can represent this challenge as follows: 
1. B1 and B2 are phenomenally similar. 
2. Clean phenomenal particularism predicts that B1 and B2 have no 
phenomenal similarities.  
Therefore 
3. Clean phenomenal particularism is false. 
 
What notion of phenomenal similarity is being invoked in this argument? 
Let’s begin with (P-Similarity) 
(P-Similarity) Experiences X and Y are phenomenally similar when there is 
an aspect of the phenomenal character of X, X*, and an aspect of the 
phenomenal character of Y, Y*, such that what its like to undergo X 
insofar as it has X* is the same as what its like to undergo Y insofar as it 
has Y*. 
When phenomenal similarity is understood in this way, the second 
premise looks true. For B1 and B2 have no character-parts in common. 
And since the phenomenal character of B2 is constituted by its p-
character-parts and the standpoint from which they are observed, any 
aspect of the phenomenal character of B2 will be determined by some
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subset of those p-character parts and the standpoint from which they are 
observed. But since B1 has none of the same character-parts as B2, there is 
no aspect of B2, B2*, such that what it is like to undergo B2 insofar as it 
has B2* is identical to any aspect of B1. 
But, on this reading of phenomenal similarity, should we accept premise 
(1)? One might take it to be obvious on the basis of introspection that B1 
and B2 are phenomenally similar. As Ganson and Mehta note, we are 
sceptical about the move from the fact that two experiences introspectively 
appear similar to the claim that they are actually phenomenally similar (p. 
6). But we needn’t invoke such skepticism here. The claim that B1 and B2 
are phenomenally similar is not made on the basis of introspection – since, 
by hypothesis, B1 is undergone by an ideal imaginer, one ‘whose 
imaginative experiences are as vivid, stable, and forceful as her genuine 
perceptual experiences’ (Mehta 2014, p.316). And we do not have an ideal 
imaginer at hand to provide introspective testimony for the truth of 
premise (1). 
Is it obvious that B1 and B2 are phenomenally similar, in the sense of 
phenomenal similarity set out by (P-Similarity)? If the intuitive similarity 
of imaginative and perceptual experiences must be accounted for in terms 
of shared phenomenal properties, then premise (1) looks to be true. But it 
isn’t mandatory to explain the intuitive similarity of imaginative and 
perceptual experiences in this way. Indeed, those phenomenal particularists 
who have discussed imaginative experiences have explained the similarity 
of imaginings and perceptual experiences not in terms of shared 
phenomenal properties but in terms of a representational connection 
between the imaginative and perceptual experience (Martin 2001, 2002, 
Soteriou 2013, ch.71): as Martin puts it, ‘We should not think of 
experience, imagery… as being phenomenologically the same not in terms 
of literally sharing experiential properties, but in virtue of a representation 
or intentional connection between them – imagery is experientially the 
same as perception through being the representation of such a perceptually 
experiential event’ (2001, p.270). If this way of explaining the similarity of 
imaginative and perceptual experiences is endorsed, there is no reason to 
take premise (1) to be true, on the reading of phenomenal similarity set 
out in (P-Similarity). 
 
1 Though note that neither Martin nor Soteriou are committed to clean phenomenal 
particuarlism. 
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What are the grounds for thinking of the similarity between imaginative 
and perceptual experiences in this way? Martin sets out a number of 
considerations. Let us mention one. Many people are attracted to the view 
that the feeling of a bodily sensation – say, an itch in one’s foot – suffices 
for the existence of a bodily sensation. And the imagining of a bodily 
sensation clearly does not suffice for the existence of a bodily sensation. 
But if we capture the intuitive similarity between imaginative and 
perceptual experiences in terms of shared phenomenal properties, then we 
seem forced to hold that itchiness is present in both cases (Martin 2002, 
p.406). We don’t pretend that this consideration is decisive. All that 
matters, for current purposes, is that premise (1) is clearly contestable 
when understood along the lines of (P-Similarity), and, indeed, has been 
contested by some who endorse forms of phenomenal particularism. 
Is there another reading of premise (1) on which it is more plausible? 
When Ganson and Mehta explain why clean phenomenal particularism 
predicts that B1 and B2 have no phenomenal similarities, they write that it 
cannot do so because ‘particulars are not identical or relevantly similar to 
non-particulars’ (p.5). This suggests an alternative conception of 
phenomenal similarity: 
(RP-Similarity) Experiences X and Y are phenomenally similar when they 
exhibit some resemblance in what its like to undergo them; that is, when 
there is an aspect of the phenomenal character of X, X*, and an aspect of 
the phenomenal character of Y, Y*, such that what its like to undergo X 
insofar as it has X* (relevantly resembles) what its like to undergo Y insofar 
as it has Y*. 
On this understanding of phenomenal similarity, (1) strikes us as true. 
There is something relevantly similar about imagining a snow-covered tree 
and perceiving a snow-covered tree. But must the clean phenomenal 
particularist think otherwise? On this reading of phenomenal similarity, 
the second premise is to be understood as the claim that what its like to 
undergo B1 does not (relevantly) resemble what it is like to undergo B2. 
Ganson and Mehta take this to be true because the character of B1 is 
constituted wholly by particulars, the character of B2 is constituted wholly 
of non-particulars, and particulars do not relevantly resemble non-
particulars. If those claims are true, there is reason to think that premise 
(2) is true on the (RP-Similarity) reading of phenomenal similarity and 
Ganson and Mehta’s argument goes through. 
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But we can resist this argument by rejecting the assumption that 
particulars do not relevantly resemble non-particulars. Within the domain 
of particulars, individual particulars of radically different ontological kinds 
can resemble one another: wax lemons resemble real lemons; holograms 
resemble solids. And such resemblances are part of what grounds the 
resemblances between the characters of an experience of a real lemon (solid) 
and experience of a wax lemon (hologram). That is, within the domain of 
particulars, things of radically different kinds can resemble one another in 
ways that are relevant to experiential resemblance. So why assume that 
things as radically different as particulars and non-particulars can’t 
resemble one another in the relevant way? We see no reason to make this 
assumption; indeed, one might even take the intuitive similarity between 
B1 and B2 to motivate the thought that particulars and non-particulars 
can resemble one another. 
The problem here is finding a reading of phenomenal similarity on which 
both premises are true. When understood on the lines of (P-Similarity), 
the second premise of Ganson and Mehta’s argument is true, but the first 
can be rejected; when understood along the lines of (RP-Similarity), the 
first premise is true, but the second can be rejected. Either way, the 
argument relies on claims that the phenomenal particularist will reject. 
4. Conclusion 
Our original defence of phenomenal particularism aimed to show why the 
phenomenal particularist need not be troubled by the objections raised in 
Mehta (2014). Ganson and Mehta’s reply helpfully clarifies the nature of 
Mehta’s original objections, but we have tried to set out why we remain 
unmoved. Once one draws on the full resources of phenomenal 
particularism, including, for example, the standpoint conditions invoked 
in Campbell (2009), and the account of imaginative experience set out by 
Martin (2001, 2002), Ganson and Mehta’s specific objections can be 
opposed. 
But as Ganson and Mehta note at the end of their reply, none of this is to 
find fault with Mehta’s form of phenomenal generalism. And they take it 
that Mehta’s version of phenomenal generalism ‘explains the motivating 
data just as well as phenomenal particularism… The phenomenal 
particularist thus not only exposes herself to serious objections, but does so 
for naught’ (p.10). We have tried to show why the phenomenal 
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particularist is not exposed to serious objection. But taking that as given, 
this would still leave phenomenal particularism and Mehta’s form of 
phenomenal generalism on a par. How should we proceed if this were the 
case? 
Answering this question takes us into deep waters concerning the correct 
methodology for deciding between theories of perceptual experience. But it 
is worth noting that one influential form of phenomenal particularism – 
the naïve realism set out and defended by M.G.F. Martin – takes 
phenomenal particularism to be ‘the best articulation of how our 
experiences strike us as being to introspective reflection on them’ (2004, 
p.42). Someone who takes this line of thought seriously is liable to think 
that even if Mehta’s phenomenal generalism could explain the motivating 
data just as well as phenomenal particularism – a claim on which we take 
no stand here – its revisionary character alone would count against 
endorsing it. J. M. Hinton’s (1967, 1973) and John McDowell’s (1982, 
pp.385-394  cf. de Gaynesford 2004, pp.4-9) motivations of phenomenal 
particularism take similar form. Ganson and Mehta ask why one should 
pay out the nose for an explanation of the particularity of experience when 
you can get it on the cheap. The answer is that in philosophy, as so often 
in life, you get what you pay for. 
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